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SURVEY ARTICLES

Admiralty Law

by George M. Earle*
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals published six admiralty
opinions in 1999. The court faced one issue of first impression, but
otherwise applied existing case law to decide the cases before it. In the
case presenting the issue of first impression, the court joined the Fifth
Circuit in holding that an ocean carrier's unreasonable deviation does
not nullify the one-year statute of limitation for filing suit under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.1 The cases decided with reference to
existing law included two cases involving maritime liens,2 one case
addressing appellate jurisdiction,3 one case addressing personal
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Former Partner in the firm of Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah,

Georgia. College of Charleston (B.A., 1985); University of South Carolina (J.D., 1990);
Tulane School of Law (LL.M. in Admiralty Law, 1991); Pi Sigma Alpha. Member, State
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1. Mesocap Indus. Ltd. v. Torm Lines, 194 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. Rose v. M/V GULF STREAM FALCON, 186 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 1999); Galehead,
Inc. v. MV ANGLIA, 183 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
3. Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. v. Europa Cruises Corp., 188 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
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jurisdiction, 4 and one case resolving whether one party's alleged
nonperformance under a contract of carriage would excuse the other
party's performance.5
I.
A.

MARITIME LIENS

Waiver of Maritime Lien for Necessaries

In Rose v. M/V GULF STREAM FALCON,' the Eleventh Circuit
employed principles of contract interpretation to determine whether a
claimant had waived his maritime lien for necessaries against a vessel.'
Reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that no waiver
had occurred and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. 8
In 1990 Alden Hanson ("Owner"), the owner of the M/V BEAU
SOUTHERN ("Vessel"), entered into discussions with Captain Mark Rose
("Claimant") for Claimant's possible purchase of the Vessel for use in
Claimant's offshore dive-excursion business. The two also discussed
using the Vessel as a commercial diving vessel. Claimant advised
Owner that the Vessel would require major renovations to be used as a
commercial diving vessel.9
From January 1990 to March 1992, the parties engaged in negotiations for a joint venture agreement whereby Claimant would renovate
and operate the Vessel, with both parties recouping their investments
from the Vessel's operations. Although the parties failed to execute a
written joint venture agreement, Claimant was permitted to renovate
the Vessel in anticipation of purchasing it.1°
In March 1992 the parties entered into a first Purchase and Sale
Agreement ("March Purchase Agreement") for the Vessel. However,
Claimant could not obtain funding and, therefore, did not purchase the
Vessel. In June 1992 the parties entered into a second Purchase and
Sale Agreement ("June Purchase Agreement"), expressly superseding the
March Purchase Agreement. The parties, together with a third patty

4. Associated Transp. Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, S.A.,
197 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1999).
5. Crowley Am. Transp., Inc. v. Richard Sewing Mach. Co., 172 F.3d 781 (11th Cir.
1999).
6. 186 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
7. Id. at 1350.
8. Id. at 1351.
9. Id. at 1347.
10. Id. The Vessel was renamed the GULF STREAM FALCON during the renovations.
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named Buckley ("Investor"), also entered into a joint venture and a
Bareboat Charter agreement ("Charter Party") pursuant to which the
Vessel would be used for whale-watching tours. Under the terms of the
Charter Party, Claimant was to serve as the captain for these excursions
and could not be removed from his position absent grossly negligent
conduct. Conflicts developed in the parties' business relationship, and
as a result, Owner and Investor removed Claimant as captain of the
Vessel. The Charter Party was subsequently canceled. "
In May 1993 Owner and Claimant decided once again to work together
in the whale-watching excursion business. Claimant was to serve again
as the captain of the Vessel. 12 On May 16, 1993, the parties entered
into the Arcadian Operating Agreement ("Operating Agreement"), which
provided, in relevant part, as follows:
3. Revenues earned in the operation of the [Vessel] will be distributed
as follows:
b) Payment of outstanding debt incurred by [Claimant] in the
conversion of the vessel to a whale watch vessel. [Owner] will make
the final determination, at his sole discretion, of which bills will be
paid.
4. All parties acknowledge that payment of the above amounts impy
[sic] no ownership interest or claim in the [Vessel] or any claim against
[Owner] for any reason.'"
The whale-watching joint venture failed to produce profits that could
be distributed to the joint venturers. As a result Claimant sued to
foreclose on his $334,476.17 maritime lien for his work in renovating the
Vessel. Owner counterclaimed for breach of contract and wrongful arrest
of the Vessel. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed all claims
and counterclaims except Claimant's maritime lien claim against the
Vessel. 14 As to that claim, the district court held that paragraphs 3
and 4 of the Operating Agreement constituted an explicit waiver by
Claimant of his lien arising from work he performed on the Vessel before
May 16, 1993. The district court awarded Claimant $15,955.81 for work
performed on the vessel after that date. 5

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1347-48.
13. Id. at 1348.
14. Id. Concluding that Owner breached the June Purchase Agreement, the district
court dismissed Owner's counterclaims arising from that agreement. Owner did not appeal
the dismissals of his counterclaims. Id. at 1347 n.2.
15. Id. at 1348.
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The Eleventh Circuit identified three issues raised on appeal: (1)
whether the district court erred in finding Claimant waived his maritime
lien for goods and services provided to the Vessel prior to May 16, 1993;
(2) whether Owner was entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the
Vessel pursuant to the June Purchase Agreement; and (3) whether the
district court erred in awarding damages to Claimant for his maritime
lien for necessaries provided to the Vessel after May 16, 1993.16
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the waiver issue by
confirming that Claimant's maritime lien arose from his provision of
necessaries to the Vessel in accordance with the Federal Maritime Lien
Act. 17 Claimant sought to recover his costs incurred in converting the
Vessel to a commercial diving vessel.'"
Before reaching the issue of waiver, the court addressed Owner's
argument that Claimant was never entitled to a maritime lien because
he was a joint venturer and, therefore, not a "stranger" to the Vessel.
The court set forth the general proposition that joint venturers usually
are not entitled to a maritime lien for necessaries because their status
is similar to that of a vessel owner.'9 A stranger to the vessel, on the
other hand, generally "is entitled to a maritime lien for 'necessaries'...
because a 'stranger' relies on the credit of the vessel, and not on the
credit of the co-venturer." °
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Owner's
argument that no lien ever existed, concluding that the district court
was not clearly erroneous in finding no joint venture existed between the
parties except between June and August of 1992.21 The court found
sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's finding
that no joint venture existed prior to June 3, 1992-the period when

16. Id. The second and third issues on appeal were not reached by the court of appeals.
Finding that the second issue was not raised by Claimant below and was not addressed by
the district court, the court declined to address Claimant's argument that the district court
erred in ruling that Owner was entitled to the first $375,000 from the sale of the Vessel.
Id. at 1351. Because the court of appeals ruled that Claimant had not waived his maritime
lien, Owner's appeal of the district court's $15,955.81 award to Claimant for his lien claim
was rendered moot. Id. The matter was remanded for the district court to recalculate the
lien amount in light of the court's ruling that the maritime lien had not been waived. Id.
17. Id. at 1348 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a) (1994)).
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Sasportes v. M/V SOL DE COPACABANA, 581 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir.
1978)).
20. Id. (citing Fulcher's Point Pride Seafood v. MN THEODORA MARIA, 935 F.2d 208,
211 (11th Cir. 1991)).
21. Id. at 1349 (noting the district court's factual findings with respect to the existence
of a joint venture must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard).
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Claimant was converting the Vessel to a commercial diving vessel.22
The court held Claimant was entitled to assert a maritime lien for work
performed on the Vessel prior to that date because he was a stranger to
the vessel, not a joint venturer.2 3
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the district court's determination
that Claimant had explicitly waived his lien pursuant to the language
of the Operating Agreement. The district court relied exclusively on the
language of the Operating Agreement to reach the conclusion that the
lien had been waived. On appeal Claimant argued that paragraph 3(b)
of the Operating Agreement merely gave Owner discretion to use profits
from the whale-watching venture to compensate Claimant for costs in
converting the Vessel from a commercial diving vessel to a whalewatching vessel. Claimant emphasized that he was seeking compensation for his earlier efforts in converting the Vessel from a treasuresalvage vessel to a commercial diving vessel, not for the later conversion
to a whale-watching vessel. Thus, the plain language of paragraph 3(b)
could not be read as a waiver of Claimant's maritime lien for the earlier
conversion of the Vessel. Claimant argued that paragraph 4 of the
Operating Agreement could not be construed as a waiver of his lien
because it merely governed the distribution of profits and confirmed that
Owner's payment of profits should not be construed to suggest that
Claimant would have any claims against Owner or the Vessel. Finally,
Claimant asserted that the Operating Agreement was ambiguous and
must be resolved against Owner, the drafter of the agreement. Owner
argued that the "whereas" clause of the Operating Agreement confirmed
Claimant's intent to waive his lien. The "whereas" clause provided, "All
parties hereto recognize and confirm that [Owner] is the sole owner of
the [Vessel] and no party has a claim against the [V]essel."2 4
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the contractual language de novo2"
and applied Florida law pursuant to conflicts of law principles.2 6
Florida law mandated that the court look first to the "words used on the
face of the contract to determine whether that contract [was] ambiguous," for Florida law provides that the actual language of the contract is

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1349-50.
25. Id. at 1350. ("Since the waiver issue relates to the district court's interpretation
of contract language, we review the lower court's decision de novo.")
26. Id.
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the best evidence of the parties' intent and, thus, that the plain meaning
of the contract language governs.27
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the language of the Operating
Agreement was not ambiguous and that its plain meaning did not
support the district court's finding of an explicit waiver of Claimant's
maritime lien. 2' The court concluded that paragraph 3(b) of the
Operating Agreement established only the priority of revenues earned
from the Vessel, if any.29 Likewise, the plain meaning of paragraph 4
of the Operating Agreement suggested that it governed only the act of
distributing revenues and, "[a]t the very least," did not constitute an
explicit waiver of any lien claims.30
Finally, the court rejected Owner's argument that the "whereas" clause
of the Operating Agreement was sufficient to find a waiver of Claimant's
maritime lien. 3' Florida law provides that "whereas" or other prefatory
clauses are not binding upon the parties to the contract." Thus, even
if the "whereas" clause could be construed as a waiver, it would not be
binding against Claimant. 3 In addition, the court of appeals stated
that it need not look to the "whereas" clause of the Operating Agreement
if the operative language of the agreement was unambiguous.34 Having
found the language of paragraphs 3(b) and 4 unambiguous, the court
declined to consider the "whereas" clause as evidence of Claimant's
intent to waive his lien.38
B.

Third-PartyProviders of Necessaries
In Galehead, Inc. v. M/VANGLIA, 8 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the issue of when a third-party provider of necessaries possesses a valid
maritime lien against a vessel. The case involved the procurement of
bunkers on three occasions by the M/V ANGLIA ("Vessel") through its
charterer, Genesis Container Line ("Charterer"). On the first occasion,
Charterer retained Polygon Energy Services, Inc. ("Polygon") to obtain
bunkers for the Vessel at Port Everglades, Florida. Polygon engaged

27. Id. (citing Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980); Boat Town U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 364 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).

28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 1350-51.
32.
1999)).
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1350 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350-51.
183 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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Establissment Asamar, Ltd. ("Asamar") to supply the fuel. Asamar
engaged Coastal Refining and Marketing, Inc. ("Coastal") to deliver the
bunkers to the Vessel. Polygon's "bunker confirmation" named Coastal
as the physical supplier and Asamar as the seller of the fuel. Asamar
subsequently paid Coastal for the fuel, but Charterer did not pay
Asamar.37
On the second occasion, Charterer retained Polygon to provide bunkers
for the Vessel, this time at Houston, Texas. Polygon again contacted
Asamar, who in turn retained ChemOil Corp. ("ChemOil") and Marsh
Distributing Company ("Marsh") to deliver the bunkers to the Vessel.
ChemOil and Marsh supplied the bunkers to the Vessel and were paid
by Asamar. Again, however, Charterer did not pay Asamar. Asamar
subsequently assigned its rights to the money due from Charterer for
both fuelings to Galehead, Inc. ("Galehead"), a collection agency.38
The third fueling occurred when Charterer contacted Polygon to obtain
bunkers for the Vessel at Houston. This time, however, Polygon directly
engaged ChemOil and Tesoro Petroleum Distributing Company
("Tesoro") to fuel the Vessel. Polygon's bunker confirmation listed
ChemOil and Tesoro as the physical suppliers and Polygon as the seller
of the fuel. Polygon paid $20,349.29 to ChemOil and Tesoro for the
amount due for the bunkers. However, Charterer failed to pay Polygon
the $24,376 due under their contract. Polygon subsequently assigned its
rights under its contract with Charterer to Galehead.39
Galehead filed suit in district court against the Vessel to foreclose the
three maritime-lien claims it obtained by assignment from Asamar and
Polygon. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district
court granted both motions in part. The district court held that Polygon
had a maritime lien against the Vessel, but that Asamar did not. The
court awarded Galehead the amount due under Polygon's contract with
Genesis, which was $24,376. However, the district court subsequently
reduced this judgment to the amount paid by Polygon to ChemOil and
Tesoro, which was $20,349.29. Galehead appealed, and the Vessel crossappealed.40

37. Id. at 1244.
38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id. On appeal the Vessel argued (1)that its fact-based affirmative defenses should
not have been resolved by motions for summary judgment and (2) that Galehead failed to
perfect proper assignments with Asamar and Polygon. Id. at 1244 n.1. The court of
appeals held, however, that the Vessel "presented no triable issue of fact on either of these
claims." Id.
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To determine the validity of the maritime lien claims, the Eleventh
Circuit began its analysis by setting forth the general test for determining who is entitled to a lien for necessaries. 4' This test, based upon the
plain meaning of the Federal Maritime Lien Act,42 provides that a
person must "(1) provide necessaries; (2) to a vessel; (3) on the order of
the owner or agent."43
With respect to the validity of Polygon's lien, the court of appeals
clarified that while Polygon did not physically supply the bunkers to the
Vessel, "a party need not be the physical supplier or deliverer to have
'provided' necessaries under the statute."" The court found it sufficient
that the bunkers were provided to the Vessel pursuant to the agreement
between Charterer and Polygon. 4' The court held that Polygon had
also satisfied the second and third elements necessary to establish a
maritime lien.46 It was undisputed that bunkers were supplied to the
Vessel and were supplied at the order of Charterer, and the court stated,
"A charterer is authorized under the statute to bind a vessel for
necessaries."47
As for Asamar's two lien claims, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
while Asamar could satisfy the first two elements of the test for
establishing a maritime lien, Asamar's actions were not performed "'on
the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner,'" and that,
therefore, the third element could not be satisfied.4 8 "Asamar provided
the bunkers at Polygon's request, and Polygon [was] not a 'person[]...
presumed to have authority to procure necessaries[.]'" 49 Thus, Asamar's two lien claims were invalid.50
The court stated that Asamar would have to show that Charterer was
sufficiently aware of and involved in Asamar's work so that it could be
shown that Asamar was in fact working for Charterer, a party authorized under the Federal Maritime Lien Act to bind a vessel for necessaries.5" In reviewing cases that have addressed this "third-party

41. Id. at 1244.
42. See 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a).
43. 183 F.3d at 1244.
44. Id. at 1245 (citing The Golden Gate Knutsen v. Associated Oil Co., 52 F.2d 397,400
(9th Cir. 1931); A/S Dan-Bunkering Ltd. v. M/V ZAMET, 945 F. Supp. 1576, 1578-79 (S.D.
Ga. 1996)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a)(4)(B)).
48. Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a)).
49. Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a)) (second and third alterations in original).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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provider" scenario, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[wihere the level of
involvement between the owner and the third-party provider was
significant and ongoing during the pertinent transaction, the courts have
found a triable issue of fact about whether the third-party deserved a
lien."5 2 The court further stated that "other cases illustrate that a
third-party provider is not entitled to a lien where 53the degree of
involvement with the owner is minimal or nonexistent."
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Asamar's relationship with
Charterer was not sufficiently significant and ongoing to "establish that
[Charterer] authorized Asamar's work on the vessel." 4 The court
55
emphasized that Charterer dealt only with Polygon, not Asamar.
Moreover, Charterer physically received no bunkers from Asamar, did
not communicate with Asamar, did not inspect Asamar's work, and did
not ratify Asamar's role in the transaction." Finally, Asamar directed
The court
all requests for payment to Polygon, not Charterer.57
of a
"a
charterer
fact
that
the
that
holding
court,
affirmed the district
party
by
a
was
performed
work
some
that
aware
vessel becomes
somewhere down the chain of contracting and re-contracting does not
give rise to a maritime lien.""
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed the district court's reduction of
Galehead's judgment from the full amoufit due under Polygon's contract
with Charterer ($24,376.00) to the amount actually paid by Polygon to
ChemOil and Tesoro ($20,349.29). The Vessel argued on appeal that the
lower amount was the correct amount because it represented the
reasonable value of the necessaries provided to the Vessel, "which is all
a maritime lien claimant is entitled to."59 The Vessel argued that
adding a commission or profit to this amount would remove the contract
from maritime jurisdiction.' Noting that the Vessel cited no supporting authority for this position, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was
no basis for holding that profits are nonmaritime and, therefore, outside
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.61 The court vacated the
district court's order on the amount of the Polygon lien, holding that

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1247.
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"[t]he natural valuation of the lien.., is the6 value
of the debt irrespec2
debt."
that
of
part
is
profit
a
whether
of
tive
II. 'JURISDICTION
A.

Appellate Jurisdictionover Interlocutory Decrees

In Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. v. Europa Cruises Corp.,63 the Eleventh
Circuit examined whether the district court's order denying plaintiff's
motions to reopen the case and to amend the complaint to add a party
was an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Concluding that
the district court's order did not determine the rights and liabilities of
the parties, the court of appeals held that appellate jurisdiction was
lacking.64 Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal.
In August 1989 Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. ("Owner") chartered the M/V65
EUROPA JET ("Vessel") to Europa Cruise Line, Ltd. ("Charterer").
Following various defaults, Charterer returned the Vessel to Owner in
November 1993. In January 1994 Owner filed suit, alleging Charterer's
redelivery of the Vessel was in breach of the charter agreement.
However, before Charterer filed an answer, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement dated February 4, 1994. The parties resolved all
claims except one for damages arising from the Vessel's condition upon
Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement,
redelivery.
Charterer made a voluntary appearance in the district court. Owner
subsequently moved the district court to compel arbitration pursuant to
the terms of the settlement agreement. By order dated April 24, 1995,
the district court granted Owner's motion and compelled the parties to
66
submit to arbitration. The district court then closed the case.
On November 20, 1997, Charterer filed a written submission for
arbitration, raising the defense that Owner was not the real party in
interest. Charterer based this defense on the fact that Owner sold the
Vessel to Marne (Delaware), Inc. ("Purchaser") during the Spring of
1990. Owner countered that it remained the registered owner of the
Vessel, retaining legal title to the Vessel while transferring only
beneficial ownership to Purchaser.67

62. Id.
63. 188 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
64. Id. at 1326.
65. Europa Cruise Line, Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Europa Cruises Corp.
Both entities are referred to collectively as "Europa." Id. at 1318 n.1.
66. Id. at 1318-19.
67. Id. at 1319.
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On December 9, 1997, a hearing was held before an arbitration panel,
the purpose of which was to permit the panel to identify the issues
before it. The panel concluded that it could not address the issue of
whether a party must be or could be added to the proceedings. The
arbitrators stated that this real-party-in-interest issue should be worked
out by the parties and that the panel was not the proper body to
determine the issue. The panel concluded that the "ruling party" would
make an application to the district court on this issue. If the district
court decided that the panel should decide the issue, the matter would
be returned to the panel for a decision. The panel directed Owner to
seek leave from the district court to amend its complaint so the district
court could decide whether to address the real-party-in-interest issue or
return it to the arbitration panel for a decision. On March 20, 1998,
Owner filed motions in the district court to reopen the case and to
amend the complaint. The district court denied both motions and a
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Owner timely appealed.68
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit focused on whether the district court's
order denying Owner's motions was appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(3). Owner asserted that the charter party between the parties
was maritime in nature and, therefore, within the district court's
admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, Owner argued, appellate jurisdiction was
proper under Section 1292(a)(3), which grants jurisdiction to appellate
courts for "'[i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges
thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty
cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed."'6 9 Charterer
countered that Owner's invocation of Section 1292(a)(3) was improper
because the dispute between the parties arose from the nonmaritime
settlement agreement, not the maritime charter agreement. Charterer
also maintained that the district court's order did not determine the
rights and liabilities of any party as contemplated by Section
70
1292(a)(3).
Noting that Owner's complaint focused on alleged breaches of the
charter party, the Eleventh Circuit held that admiralty jurisdiction was
present and that, therefore, the lower court's order denying Owner's
motions was also within the district court's admiralty jurisdiction.71
The court rejected Charterer's argument that the issues on appeal
related only to the parties' settlement agreement.7 2 The court noted

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 1319-20 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (1994)).
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Id.
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that the settlement agreement was not at issue in the district court's
order and, indeed, was not mentioned in the order.7 3
The court then addressed whether the orders appealed from determined the rights and liabilities of the parties within the meaning of
Section 1292(a)(3), so that the court of appeals would have appellate
jurisdiction over the district court's order, which Owner conceded was an
interlocutory decree.7 4 Owner asserted that the district court's order
denying the motions to reopen the case and to amend the complaint
determined the rights and liabilities of the parties because the arbitration panel would not proceed without the real-party-in-interest issue
being resolved. Owner asserted, therefore, that the district court's
orders determined the parties' rights "by foreclosing all avenues of
relief."7 5
While finding no cases directly addressing this issue, the Eleventh
Circuit held that prior decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
provided sufficient guidance on the issue of jurisdiction under Section
1292(a)(3).76 The court set forth the general rule as follows: "[A]
district court's order resolving one or more claims on the merits is
appealable under § 1292(a)(3), irrespective of any claims that remain
pending. Similarly, [the court of appeals] has jurisdiction over the
appeal of an order dismissing on the merits one or more parties from an
action."77 However, jurisdiction under Section 1292(a)(3) does not stand
"when the order appealed from 'does not reach the merits of the claim
and in no way determines, denies, or prejudices any substantive rights
of the parties.' 78
The Eleventh Circuit noted that authority within the circuit "appear[ed] to differ" on whether Section 1292(a)(3) should be interpreted
broadly or narrowly.79 The court determined, however, that "the
greater weight of authority supports a narrow construction.""0 The
court cited its opinion in Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge
HERCULES"' as setting forth the original purpose of Section 1292(a)(3):

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
1981)).
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320-21.
Id. at 1321 (footnote omitted).
Id. (quoting Jensenius v. Texaco, Inc., 639 F.2d 1342, 1343 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar.
Id. at 1322.

80. Id.
81. 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1993).
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"As our predecessor court ... noted, this provision originally 'was
designed to apply in circumstances distinctive to admiralty where it is
not uncommon for a court to enter an order finally determining the
issues of liability between the parties and then to refer the case to a
master for a determination of damages.'" 2
The court pointed out that the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth
supported this narrow interpretation of Section
Circuits also
83
1292(a)(3).
The court of appeals conceded, however, that one Eleventh Circuit
opinion and decisions from the Second and Third Circuits appeared to
support jurisdiction in this case.84 The court noted that in Isbrandtsen
Marine Services, Inc. v. M/V INAGUA TANIA,"5 foreign seamen had
tried to intervene in an in rem admiralty action to assert their maritime
liens for wages, supplies, and repairs. 8 The district court, which had
already ordered the interlocutory sale of the vessel, denied the seamen's
motion because of deficiencies in their pleadings.8 7 Noting that the
seamen were foreign and, thus, deserving of the court's protection and
that the vessel often serves as the only asset against which seamen can
enforce their claims, the Eleventh Circuit held in Isbrandtsen Marine
Services that "'it is ... clear that the interlocutory order denying
intervention to the seamen constitutes an appealable order determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)
requires.'""
Turning to the facts of Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit
stated that Owner "must first demonstrate that the district court's order
in fact precludes all avenues of relief." 9 The court commented that
Owner faced "stormy seas" in this regard, pointing out that "nothing in
the record establishes that the arbitration panel cannot proceed on the
Moreover, "neither the settlement
merits of [Owner's] claim."9"
agreement nor the order compelling the parties to arbitration ...
precludes the panel from determining whether [Purchaser] is the real-

82. 188 F.3d at 1322 (quoting JamaicaCommodity Trading Co., 992 F.2d at 1163).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1323 (citing A.H. Bull Steamship Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir.
1956) (per curiam); Kingstate Oil v. MN GREEN STAR, 815 F.2d 918, 922-24 (3d Cir.
1987)).
85. 93 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 1996).
86. 188 F.3d at 1323.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting 93 F.3d at 733).
89. Id. at 1324.
90. Id.
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party-in-interest."9 ' Finally, the court found that Owner likely would
have other avenues for obtaining relief even without arbitration.9 2 For
example, Owner could file a separate lawsuit based upon the settlement
agreement, or Owner could move "the district court to reopen and
reconsider its order compelling arbitration in light of the alleged fraud
in, or breach of, the foundational settlement agreement."9 3
In the end the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend IsbrandtsenMarine
Services and "break new ground in this circuit to hold that denial of
motions to reopen a case and amend the complaint determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties." 94 The court noted that Isbrandtsen
Marine Services would be applicable in this case only if Purchaser, a
nonparty, had been denied leave to intervene by the district court.95
Moreover, the facts of the present matter did not "give rise to a special
duty of the court such as the duty owed to the foreign seamen in
96
Isbrandtsen."
The Eleventh Circuit held that jurisdiction under
Section § 1292(a)(3) was absent because the order denying Owner's
motions to reopen the case and to amend the complaint "did not resolve
any claim on the merits or dismiss a party, or even one claim with
respect to a party."97
PersonalJurisdiction: Long-Arm Jurisdiction
In Associated Transport Line, Inc. v. ProductosFitosanitariosProficol
El Carmen, S.A. ,98 the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant was proper. The court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the lawsuit for want of personal
jurisdiction, concluding (1) that jurisdiction based upon Florida's longarm statute was improper because defendant did not commit a tort
within that state and (2) that Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would not support jurisdiction because defendant had
insufficient contacts with the United States.99
Productos Fitosanitarios Profico El Carmen, S.A. ("Shipper") contracted with Associated Transport Line, Inc. ("Carrier") to transport a cargo
of herbicide from Colombia to a purchaser in Trinidad. The shipping
B.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted).
197 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1074-76.
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documents, which were prepared and signed in Colombia, confirmed that
the carrying vessel would stop in Texas and Florida before delivering the
cargo to Trinidad. Carrier maintained that the shipping documents did
not identify the chemical content of the herbicide."
.
During the voyage the herbicide leaked onto the deck of the vessel
while it was in Florida waters. The United States Coast Guard ordered
Carrier to clean up the spill. Carrier's Colombian agents contacted
Shipper to obtain the chemical name of the herbicide so that Carrier
would know the proper means of cleaning and disposing of the cargo.
Carrier alleged that Shipper misidentified the cargo as a dangerous
environmental pollutant when in fact it was a far less harmful product.
Carrier alleged that because of this misidentification, it incurred
$673,177 in cleanup costs. Carrier further alleged that had the cargo
been properly identified, cleanup costs would have amounted to only
$15,000.101

Carrier sought reimbursement of the excess cleanup costs by filing suit
against Shipper in district court in Florida, seeking recovery under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA")' °2 and the general maritime law. Shipper sought
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Carrier argued that personal
jurisdiction over Shipper was proper under (1) the tort prong of Florida's
long-arm statute, °3 and (2) Rule 4(k)(2), which is the "national longarm statute."1 °4 Shipper countered that neither jurisdictional hook
was applicable because no tort occurred in Florida and because Shipper
had insufficient contacts with either Florida or the United States to
support jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, and
Carrier timely appealed.' °
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was proper under Florida's long-arm statute. The court
stated simply that Carrier must show that Shipper committed a tort in
Florida. 10 6 Carrier argued that Shipper's misidentification of the cargo
"caused a clean-up to occur in Florida."" °7 Carrier asserted that
Shipper's actions constituted a CERCLA violation and that under the
reasoning of the court in Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 0 8 a tort based

100.
101.
i02.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071-72.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
197 F.3d at 1072.
Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
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upon a 1 CERCLA
violation takes place where the environmental hazard
09
occurs.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, focusing on the nature of the alleged
tort committed by Shipper.11 The court clarified that the basis of
Carrier's complaint was not Shipper's alleged negligence in causing the
spill that resulted in the cleanup costs.'
Indeed, Carrier did not
allege that Shipper played any role in causing the spill." 2 Rather,
Carrier sought recovery for Shipper's alleged misidentification of the
cargo as hazardous, which caused Carrier to pay more for the cleanup
than it should have." 3 Therefore, the court concluded that Shipper's
liability to Carrier would have to arise from a duty to communicate
accurately the chemical nature of the herbicide." 4 Any breach of this
duty would have had to occur in Colombia, where Shipper's representatives informed Carrier's Colombian agents of the identity of the
cargo." 5 Thus, the court reasoned, the alleged tort occurred in
Colombia, not Florida." 6
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was proper under Rule 4(k)(2). The court explained that
Rule 4(k)(2) "permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants for claims arising under federal law when the defendant has
sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole, but is without sufficient
contacts to satisfy the long-arm statute of any particular state."" 7 The
court then set forth the due process requirements that must be satisfied
for the exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2):
[Defendant's] contacts with the nation as a whole must be (1) either
related to the plaintiff's cause of action or have given rise to it; (2)
involve some act by which the defendant has purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum; and (3)must
be such that it should reasonably have anticipated being haled into
court there. 118
The Eleventh Circuit examined Shipper's contacts with the United
States, which included the export of Shipper's products to the United

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

197 F.3d at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1074 (citing SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Id.
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States on 9 occasions, the purchase of goods from the United States on
193 occasions, and the shipment of the herbicide in the present
matter."9 The court held Shipper's alleged single act of misidentifying
the cargo that was transported through Florida waters would not
support jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). 120 Likewise, Shipper's purchases from the United States (nonrelated contacts) were not sufficiently
pervasive to support jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). 12 1 The court
stated that "a party's purchases in the United States are never enough
to justify jurisdiction." 2 2 Finally, the court concluded that Shipper's
nine sales in the United States during a four-year period were not
12
sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction over Shipper.
dismissal of
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
124
Carrier's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

III.
A.

CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA

Nonperformance of Contractas Excusing Performance

In Crowley American Transport, Inc. v. Richard Sewing Machine
Co. , 125 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to an ocean carrier on its claim for unpaid freight
and reasonable attorney fees. 12 Richard Sewing Machine Co. ("Shipper") entered into a contract with Crowley American Transport, Inc.
("Carrier") to transport two containers of textiles and machines from
Miami, Florida to the "Free Trade Zone" in Managua, Nicaragua. The
contract 127 provided that upon arrival of the cargo in Managua, Carrier
Sama & Cia, Ltda. ("Receiver") and a
would notify both Industrias
128
Nicaraguan bank ("Bank).
Carrier delivered the cargo to the Free Trade Zone and notified
Receiver, but not the Bank, of the cargo's arrival. Carrier then
entrusted the cargo to Nicaraguan customs authorities, who were

119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1075.

122.

Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418

(1984)).

123. Id.
124. Id. at 1076.
125. 172 F.3d 781 (11th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 786.
127. Two bills of lading were issued, one for each container. Id. at 783. The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the bills of lading served both as negotiable documents of title and as
the contract of carriage between the parties thereto. Id. at 783 n.2.
128. Id. at 783.

1030

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

expected to release the cargo upon receipt of the two original bills of
lading. Shipper had previously forwarded the original bills of lading to
the Bank with instructions to surrender them to Receiver upon
Receiver's execution of time drafts in the amount of $473,704 in favor of
Shipper. Upon arrival of the cargo, Receiver went to the Bank, but
refused to execute the time drafts. As a result the Bank would not
to Receiver. Instead, the Bank returned the
surrender the bills of lading
129
bills of lading to Shipper.
Because the cargo remained unclaimed, Shipper contracted with
Carrier to return the cargo from Managua. However, Carrier discovered
that Receiver had obtained the cargo from Nicaraguan customs officials
without presenting the original bills of lading. Pursuant to a Nicaraguan court order obtained by Carrier, Receiver returned the containers
to Carrier, who transported them back to Miami. Shipper subsequently
had sustained damage while it was in
discovered that the cargo
30
Receiver's possession.
Upon Shipper's refusal to pay Carrier for the transportation of the
containers to and from Managua, Carrier filed suit in district court for
breach of contract to collect the amount due. Shipper answered that
Carrier breached its contractual obligations by (1) failing to notify the
Bank upon the arrival of the cargo in Managua and (2) failing to protect
the cargo from misappropriation by Receiver. Shipper also counterclaimed for the damage allegedly sustained by the cargo while in
Receiver's possession.'
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
Carrier's motion on its breach of contract claims and against Shipper on
its counterclaims. Carrier subsequently moved for summary judgment
on the issue of damages, including a request for attorney fees. The
district court granted this motion, and Shipper timely appealed.' 3 2
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of notification. The
court identified the following two undisputed facts: (1) Carrier was
contractually obligated to notify the Bank of the cargo's arrival, and (2)
33
Carrier breached this contractual duty by failing to notify the Bank.1
However, Carrier's breach did not end the court's inquiry. The issue was
whether Carrier's breach was sufficiently material to excuse Shipper's

129.

Id.

130.

Id. at 783-84.

131. Id. at 784.
132. Id.
133. Id. The record confirmed that the Bank was notified of the cargo's arrival, but
allegedly not by Carrier. Id. at 784 n.5.
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nonpayment or nonperformance of the contract."" The court found
that the only purpose of the notification provision was to alert the Bank
and Receiver to commence the exchange of bills of lading and bank
drafts.1 3 5 This goal, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, was accomplished
when Carrier notified Receiver of the cargo's arrival.1 36 Thus, the
court held that Carrier's failure to notify the Bank was immaterial and
did not excuse Shipper's nonperformance of the contract.'37
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed Shipper's counterclaims. On
Shipper's counterclaim seeking recovery of damages for Receiver's
misappropriation of the containers, the court resolved the issue by
proximate-causation analysis. 138 The court emphasized that a "party
cannot recover damages for breach of contract unless it can prove that
the damages were proximately caused by the breach." 139 The court
found no evidence in the record to show that the Bank would have
prevented the misappropriation of the cargo had Carrier notified the
Bank of the cargo's arrival. 4 °
The court then addressed whether Carrier had a contractual duty to
prevent Receiver's misappropriation of the cargo. Shipper argued that
Carrier had a contractual duty to deliver the cargo to Receiver upon
presentation of the original bills of lading. Because Carrier surrendered
the cargo to Nicaraguan customs authorities without receiving the
original bills of lading, Carrier breached its contractual duty to deliver
the cargo.' 4 ' The court of appeals, finding no such contractual duty,
rejected Shipper's argument. 14 2 The court found that the contract
required only that Carrier deliver the cargo to the Free Trade Zone and
notify Receiver of its arrival; it did not require Carrier to supervise the
cargo until Receiver presented the original bills of lading for the
cargo. 1"3 Therefore, the court reasoned, Receiver's misappropriation
of the cargo could not constitute a breach of the contract by Carrier and
would not excuse Shipper's nonperformance of the contract. 14

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 784 (citing 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 701 (1991)).
Id.
Id.

139.

Id. (citing 5 ARTHUR LINTON
Id. at 784-85.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §

997 (1964)).

Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.

144. Id. This conclusion resolved Shipper's counterclaim on this issue as well. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit then addressed Shipper's counterclaim for
negligence. Citing the Harter Act,' the court stated that "a carrier
has a non-waivable duty, independent of any contractual duties, to effect
a 'proper delivery' of cargo entrusted to it."'" The court explained that
"[w]hether there has been a proper delivery is determined by what is
customary at the port of delivery."'47 The court found a "proper
delivery" based upon Carrier's unrebutted evidence that in Nicaragua it
was customary to surrender cargo to customs authorities, who in turn
were expected to deliver the cargo to the proper party upon presentation
of original bills of lading.' 4 The court affirmed the district
court,
49
holding that Carrier did not breach its Harter Act duties.
Finally, the court addressed the district court's award of attorney fees
to Carrier. The court set forth the American Rule, which provides that
attorney fees are not recoverable by the prevailing party absent "certain
50
common law and statutory exceptions or a contractual provision."'
Carrier relied upon language in the contract that provided, "Carrier
shall be entitled to recover all costs of collection, including reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses."' 5 ' Shipper asserted that Carrier's
contractual right to recover attorney fees applied only to administrative
actions before the Federal Maritime Commission.'5 2 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, finding the contract imposed no
requirement on Carrier to pursue its claim in administrative proceedings
and in no way limited the collection of attorney fees to those incurred in
administrative proceedings.' 53 Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's award of attorney fees.15
B.

UnreasonableDeviation: Effect upon COGSA's Time Bar
In Mesocap Industries Ltd. v. Torm Lines,'55 the Eleventh Circuit
resolved a previously open question in the circuit-whether under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"),5' an unreasonable deviation

145. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1994).
146. 172 F.3d at 785.
147. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Imparca Lines, 646 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. Unit B
May 1981)).
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id.
194 F.3d 1342 (lth Cir. 1999).
See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1994).
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by an ocean carrier prevents the carrier from invoking the one-year
statute of limitation for filing suit for cargo damage. 157 Like the Fifth
Circuit, the court held that an unreasonable deviation does not oust
COGSA's time bar.'58
Mesocap Industries Ltd. and Tradelink Exports Corp. (collectively
"Cargo Interests") filed a lawsuit on September 25, 1999 against Torm
Lines ("Carrier"). Cargo Interests sought to recover for damage allegedly
sustained by cargo stowed in one of three containers carried on Carrier's
vessel. Cargo Interests conceded that suit was not filed within COGSA's
one-year limitation period. Carrier conceded for purposes of appeal that
it unreasonably deviated from the contract of carriage. The only issue
on appeal was whether a carrier's unreasonable deviation prevents the
carrier from invoking COGSA's one-year limitation for filing suit.5 9
Carrier moved to dismiss Cargo Interests' complaint on the ground
that it was filed more than one year after the delivery of the cargo or the
date the cargo should have been delivered, in contravention of COGSA's
one-year limitation for filing suit."6 Cargo Interests opposed Carrier's
motion, arguing that Carrier unreasonably deviated from the contract of
carriage, thereby nullifying the contract of carriage and making
COGSA's one-year limitation period inapplicable.' 6 ' The district court
granted Carrier's motion, relying upon the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Bunge Edible Oil Corp. v. M/V TORM RASK, 162 in which the court
held that "[a]n unreasonable course deviation by a carrier does not
prevent it from invoking COGSA's one-year limitation because the
limitation has no conceptual nexus with cargo risk allocation."" 6
Cargo Interests appealed."' 4
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the effect of a carrier's unreasonable
deviation on COGSA's time bar was unsettled in the circuit. 165 While
the court had previously addressed the effect of an unreasonable
deviation upon a carrier's right to invoke COGSA's package limitation,' it had not addressed the specific issue before it in Mesocap

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

194 F.3d at 1343
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1342-43.
Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6)).
Id.
949 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), affg 756 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. La. 1991).
194 F.3d at 1343.
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1344.
See Unimac Co. v. C. F. Ocean Serv., 43 F.3d 1434, 1437 n.5 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Industries."7
Acknowledging that decisions from other courts 8'
supported Cargo Interests' argument that an unreasonable deviation
ousts COGSA's one-year limitation, including an opinion from the
Southern District of Florida, 169 the court rejected Cargo Interests'
argument, instead adopting the reasoning advanced by the Fifth Circuit

in Bunge Edible Oil Corp.17o Based on the Fifth Circuit's holding that
a carrier's unreasonable deviation may have a logical relationship to the
parties' risk of loss with respect to the cargo, the Eleventh Circuit
stated, "[Hience the need for elimination of the per package limitation
defense."' 7' However, the unreasonable deviation has no relationship
to the parties' expectations concerning when to sue.'72 Thus, "[nlo
justification exists ... to nullify COGSA's limitation period merely
because a carrier veers off course."'73 The court of appeals affirmed
the district court, joining the Fifth Circuit in holding that an unreasonable course deviation does not nullify COGSA's one-year limitation
period. 74

167. 194 F.3d at 1344 (citing Unimac Co., 43 F.3d at 1437 n.5 ("[W]e need not decide
whether a deviation would strip a carrier of both the $500 limitation on liability and the
statute of limitations, or as the Fifth Circuit has held, merely of the liability limitation, and
not of the one-year statute of limitations.")).
168. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Galin, 1988 A.M.C. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
169. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. International Shipping Corp., 1982 A.M.C. 1763, 1769 (S.D.
Fla. 1981), af/'d on other grounds, 703 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1983).
170. 194 F.3d at 1345.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1342 (citing Bunge Edible Oil Corp., 756 F. Supp. at 263-66).
174. Id. at 1345.

